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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
S. H. BENNION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
SHELL OIL COMPANY, a 
Delaware corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
~d 
UTAH STATE BOARD OF OIL, 
GAS & MINING, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 18345 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts in appellee's Brief is misleading 
and ignores certain crucial facts. 
A. Mr. Bennion's Status as a Nonconsenting Owner. 
At the time that the drilling unit was formed, most of 
the proposed 7 working interest owners in the unit were major oil 
companies. (Shell Ex. 7 Operator's Agreement, pp. 12-13) There 
were also 54 other interest owners in the unit that did not pay 
any production costs. (Shell Ex. 7 Oil Division Order) Although 
it may have been more convenient for Shell if Mr. Bennion became 
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a working interest owner at Shell's invitation, there was no 
legal obligation imposed upon Mr. Bennion to consent to become a 
working interest owner or to directly pay any production costs. 
There was also no legal requirement that he sign an operator's 
agreement. He eventually was treated similarly as the other 54 
interest owners in the unit who also did not risk their capital 
for the drilling of the well. 
Prior to drilling, Section 1 had been unitized by the 
Utah Board of Oil, Gas & Mining. There was no legal necessity 
for Mr. Bennion to consent because upon entry of the spacing 
order Mr. Bennion became entitled by law to a landowner's royalty 
and to receive his proportionate share of the production from the 
unit after deducting his proportionate share of the costs of 
drilling the well and paying his proportionate share of the 
1 expense of producing any oil and gas. Shell fails to enlighten 
this Court in its Statement of Facts that at no time did Mr. 
Bennion have any legal requirement imposed upon him to consent to 
be a working interest owner or to sign any operator's agreement 
with Shell. It also fails to mention Shell's Ex. 6, which is a 
letter to Mr. Bennion's attorney dated February 3, 1975, wherein 
Shell recognized Mr. Bennion's entitlements. (Shell Ex. 6) 
1 Section 40-6-6(g), prior to the 1977 amendments, expressly 
provides that Mr. Bennion, as a nonconsenting owner, was 
entitled to a basic landowner's 1/8th royalty and his 
proportionate share of production. 
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B. Mr. Bennion's Tender of Costs. 
Appellee states in its Statement of Facts that Mr. 
Bennion tendered payment to Shell of his alleged share of expen-
ditures, but the payment was conditioned upon Shell's agreement 
that his share in the unit was greater than Shell believed to be 
the case. While it is true that Mr. Bennion in tendering Shell 
the sum of $26,293.87 in a check dated December 15, 1975, comput-
ed this amount based upon an incorrect percentage, it is also 
true that the amount of money tendered to Shell for his share of 
the costs was in excess of what Shell claimed was his obligation. 
Moreover, Mr. Bennion' s computat.ion of his interest is consistent 
with Shell's own computation contained in its Division Order sent 
to Mr. Bennion on February 11, 1975. (Shell's Ex. 7) It is also 
consistent with the Board's Order unitizing this section because 
the Board's Order specifically states that each unit shall be 640 
acres in size, not 678.2 acres which is the actual size of 
Section 1. (Appendix No. 4 to Appellant's Brief) Shell used the 
actual size of Section 1 in computing the percentage of Mr. 
Bennion's interests and all of the other interest owners in the 
unit, and Mr. Bennion used 640 acres, the usual size of a sec-
tion. 
Moreover, Shell never offered to accept Mr. Bennion's 
tender of costs based upon the amount of Mr. Bennion's interest 
that the parties agreed upon and leave the remaining small 
percentage difference for further negotiation or judicial 
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resolution. Rather Shell rejected Mr. Bennion's December, 1975 
tender of costs and refused to pay Mr. Bennion any production 
from the well for almost seven years because it was concerned, at 
that time, about a .001 per cent difference between what Mr. 
Bennion reasonably calculated to be his interest, .0312500%, 
based upon the Board's Spacing Order, Shell's own Division Order 
and the usual size of a section, and what Shell was claiming was 
Mr. Bennion's interest, .0294898%. 
C. Shell's Refusal to Tender Mr. Bennion His Production 
in Kind. 
Shell claims in its Statement of Facts that an additional 
reason why it refused to pay Mr. Bennion his payment in kind, 
even though it knew from day one that Mr. Bennion wanted his oil 
and gas in kind and knew that he had a legitimate business need 
for the product, was that it did not want to reward Mr. Bennion 
with increased oil prices. There is nothing in the record below 
to substantiate this claim on the part of Shell and therefore 
such a statement is merely after the fact conjecture supplied by 
Shell's counsel. Moreover, such a statement is directly contrary 
and logically inconsistent with the fact that Shell knew from the 
very beginning that Mr. Bennion wanted his product in kind. It 
cannot now claim that it withheld product from Mr. Bennion 
because it did not want him to receive the benefit of increased 
oil prices, when at the very beginning when Shell knew that Mr. 
Bennion wanted his product and refused to provide it to him, he 
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clearly would not have been benefiting from any increased oil 
prices if the production in kind at that time was tendered to him 
as he had requested. Mr. Gallion, Shell's counsel, doesn't even 
mention any concern of increased oil prices in his August 25, 
1977 letter (Exhibit A-6). 
The fact of increased oil prices and whether or not Mr. 
Bennion would eventually benefit from them was caused as a direct 
result of Shell's failure to provide Mr. Bennion with his product 
in kind evidently because there was a thousandths of a per cent 
difference between Mr. Bennion and Shell. Shell now contends 
illogically that it did not want Mr. Bennion to receive unfairly 
the benefit of increased oil prices when quite obviously this 
reason would have nothing to do with why Shell did not provide 
Mr. Bennion with his product in kind at the outset, and continu-
ing thereafter, at a time when Mr. Bennion would not have bene-
fitted from any price increases. 
D. Mr. Bennion's Receipt of Accounting Information. 
It was only after the July 26, 1979 Board hearing that 
Mr. Bennion received any meaningful accounting information from 
Shell. Prior to this time he had received an audit done by 
Tenneco, but the audit covered only the period from January, 1973 
through December, 1974. (See pg. 5, July 9, 1980 Accountant 
letter to Stirba.) Obviously, since the unit well started to 
produce in July, 1974, the Tenneco audit was of little use to Mr. 
Bennion since it only covered the initial operation of the well. 
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The only other information he has received prior to this time was 
a two-page worksheet which is annexed to Shell's Exhibit 18. 
In other words, prior to going before the Board pursuant 
to the Amended Application, Mr. Bennion had received absolutely 
no itemized expenditure information for the years 1975, 1976, 
1977, 1978, and 1979. He had also received no production infor-
mation prior to July, 1977, and thereafter he received no addi-
tional production information until after the July, 1979 Board ~ 
hearing. After the July, 1979 hearing Shell provided to Mr. 
Bennion's counsel additional accounting information. (Ex. A-8 
through A-12, Shell Ex. 23) The handwritten sheets provided by 
Shell contain numerous errors and internal inconsistencies and 
are not internally consistent in reporting the volume of gas and 
oil produced from the well. 
It was in response to these facts and the fact that 
Shell's state reports did not conform with the production figures 
reported to Mr. Bennion in its worksheet submitted to Mr. 
Bennion's accountant in September, 1977 that the Board entered 
its Order allowing Mr. Bennion to audit Shell's books and records 
in Houston, Texas at Shell's expense. Mr. Bennion had already 
been given three different sets of figures and the Board's Order 
was justified. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT MAY REVIEW ALL QUESTIONS OF LAW RAISED BY THIS 
APPEAL AND SUBSTITUTE ITS OWN JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE 
BOARD ON MATTERS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. 
- 6 -
.~ 
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:~ 
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As noted by Defendant-Respondent, this appeal raises 
important issues of first impression in the state of Utah regard-
ing the proper construction of Utah's Oil and Gas Conservation 
Act. Specifically, the appeal calls into question the interpre-
tation of the Act's use of the term "production" and the correct 
method of computing royalty and working interests under the Act. 
Also, other questions of law arising out of the relationship 
between the unit operator of an oil and gas well and a noncon-
senting working interest owner, as defined by the Act, are 
presented by this appeal. 
In its Brief, Shell attempts to limit this Court's powers 
by coaxing it to accept as the proper standard of review one 
which would allow the Court to set aside a Board decision only on 
a finding that the Board acted arbitrarily or capriciously. Such 
a limitation on the scope of review in this case is a serious 
misapprehension of basic principles in the field of administra-
tive law. A judicial tribunal is always empowered to review 
determinations of law made by administrative bodies such as the 
Board of Oil, Gas & Mining. And when the Board or other body is 
found to have acted improperly the Court is free to substitute 
its own judgment for the judgment of the Board. See Packard 
Motor Car Company v. N.L.R.B., 330 U. S. 485 (1947). 
There are times when the legislature precludes by statute 
any judicial review, or limits the scope of judicial review by 
giving the administrative tribunal greater authority in certain 
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areas of its expertise. It can be argued that legislative 
silence concerning judicial review should be taken to mean courts 
must pay more deference to the administrative determinations. 
But none of these legislative considerations are present in this 
Court's review of the Board's decision. The applicable section 
of the Act governing judicial appeal of Board action is Section 
40-6-lO(b) which expressly provides that: 
An action or appeal involving any provision of 
this act, or a rule, regulation, or order shall be 
determined as expeditiously as feasible. The trial 
court shall determine the issues on both questions 
of law and fact and shall affirm or set aside such 
rule, regulation or order or remand the cause to the 
commission for further proceedings. Such court is 
hereby authorized to enjoin permanently the enforce-
ment by the commission of this act, or any part 
thereof, or any act done or threatened thereunder, 
if the plaintiff shall show that as to him the act 
or conduct complained of is unreasonable, unjust, 
arbitrary or capricious, or violates any constitu-
tional right of the plaintiff, or if the plaintiff 
shows that the act complained of does not constitute 
or result in waste, or does not in a reasonable 
manner accomplish an end that is the subject matter 
of this act. (Emphasis Added.) 
It could not be clearer. The statute gives to the trial 
court the responsibility of determining the issues of law and 
fact in any case where the appeal involves a provision of the 
act, or an order of the Board. It is precisely such an appeal 
that Mr. Bennion took to the Third Judicial District Court and 
now brings to this Court. As is clearly seen from reading the 
statute in its entirety, the criteria for review which the 
Respondent would mistakenly have this Court follow, pertain only 
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when one is seeking injunctive relief against the Board. This is 
not the relief sought by Mr. Bennion. 
Shell's misunderstanding of the appeals provision of the 
Act is evident by its statement of what it calls the "review of 
discretionary administrative orders." (Respondent's Brief at 
11.) The statute, as noted conclusively above, expressly pro-
vides for the review of both questions of fact and law. But even 
if that provision were not a part of the Act, this Court would 
have authority to substitute its own judgment for the Board's 
when construing the meaning of the statute. Statutory con-
struction is always considered a question of law, and so being is 
left to the independent determination of the judicial tribunal to 
whom the appeal is taken. Packard Motor Car Company v. N.L.R.B., 
330 U.S. at 491 (1947). This is especially true where, as is the 
case here, its administrative body is composed principally of 
non-lawyers. 
This Court has recognized the principle that courts 
always must exercise their judicial prerogative and decide 
questions of law. For example, in Utah Hotel Company v. Indus-
trial Commission, 151 P.2d 467 (Utah 1944), the Supreme Court 
held that questions of law must always be determined in the first 
instance by a court of law; otherwise, the determination could 
not carry the force of law. In that case, the Utah Hotel Company 
brought suit against the Industrial Commission to review a 
commission order which held the Hotel Company liable for unpaid 
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taxes on all members of interstate orchestras. The court stated 
that the Industrial Commission had authority to interpret the 
Employment Security Act as necessary, but that such interpre-
tations were not binding on the courts. Final decisions, on 
matters of law, are binding only when made by an appropriate 
judicial tribunal: 
A "decision" or "finding" by an administrative 
agency upon a judicial question is never a binding 
decision, for under the doctrines of supremacy of 
law and a separation of powers a binding decision 
of a question of law affecting private rights may 
only be made by an·appropriate court acting judi-
cially. Id. at 470. (Emphasis added.) 
The cases cited by.Shell do not support its arguments. 
In not one of those cases is there a statute which resembles the 
language in §40-6-lO(b). Language from one of the opinions 
quoted by Shell in its Brief is illustrative of Shell's misunder-
standing of the law of judicial review under 'the circumstances of 
this case: 
. the well-established rule is that the courts 
indulge [the administrative tribunal] considerable 
latitude in determinations he makes on questions of 
fact and also in the exercise of his discretion 
with respect to the responsibilities which the law 
imposes on him .... Respondent's Brief at 11 
(quoting from Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Brimhall, 
28 Utah 2d 14, 18, 497 P.2d 638, 641 (1972). 
(Emphasis added) 
Thus, even the cases relied upon by Shell do not leave 
questions of law to the discretion of the Board. In the original 
appeal to the Third Judicial District the parties stipulated that 
there existed no genuine issues as to any material fact. 
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Judgment and Order of Dismissal at 21. But even if there were, 
the language of § 40-6-lO(b) is unequivocal. The court shall 
decide both questions of law and fact. See also Withers v. 
Golding, 111 P.2d 550 (Utah 1941). 
II. MR. BENNION'S PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF OIL AND GAS PRODUC-
TION FROM THE TEWl-lBS WELL VESTED AT THE TIME OF THE 
SPACING ORDER AND HIS RIGHTFUL SHARE OF PRODUCTION SHOULD 
BE AWARDED IN KIND FROM THE ENTRY OF THAT ORDER. 
In its Brief, Shell makes two basic arguments against Mr. 
Bennion's right to receive his proportionate share of oil and gas 
in kind: 
(1) That the law of capture prevails until the entry of 
the pooling order and, therefore, Mr. Bennion has no statutory or 
common law right to any production--in cash or in kind--until the 
date of that order, and 
(2) That it would be grossly unfair for Mr. Bennion to 
receive his proportionate share in kind. Neither argument 
adequately addresses the legal issues framed by this appeal, nor 
do they satisfy the significant circumstances presented in this 
case. 
A. ortion-
ate Share o Production Prior to the Foo Order. 
Shell's first argument that the law of capture operates 
to deny Mr. Bennion any rights at all in his private property 
prior to the entry of a pooling order ignores the impact of 
Utah's Oil and Gas Conservation Act on the common law. Both the 
. Board and the trial court recognized that under Utah's Oil & Gas 
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Conservation Act a nonconsenting owner such as Mr. Bennion has a 
right to production which vests prior to the date of the pooling 
order. In an earlier case, In re Bennion, Cause No. 139-18, the 
Board stated: 
With respect to the applicant's rights under 
§40-6-6(h), U.C.A., the Board must again first 
address the issue of jurisdiction. The Board 
rejects the narrow construction of 40-6-6(h), 
U.C.A., presented by Gulf Oil Company. Gulf 
maintains that this becomes viable only upon the 
filing of a petition for relief under the pro-
vision, thus precluding the Board from requiring 
Gulf to pay the applicant a landowner's royalty of 
1/8th from the date of first production from the 
subject well. However, the Board construes 
§40-6-6(h), U.C.A., as a statutory rendition of the 
rights of non-consenting working interest owners. 
The statute allows the nonconsenting owner 
certain property rights which become effective when 
oil is produced upon a drilling unit. While the 
petitioner may request the Board to enforce those 
rights, they do not lie dormant until triggered by 
a petition. (Emphasis Added.) 
This position taken by the Board and the trial court is 
in accordance with the weight of case law and scholarship on the 
issue. See Appellant's Brief at 11-19 and authorities cited 
therein. 
Furthermore, Shell completely ignores the fact that the 
Spacing Order entered by the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining in 
Cause No. 139-8 on September 20, 1972, expressly precluded Mr. 
Bennion, or anyone other than Shell, from drilling a well in the 
section covered by the Spacing Order. In other words, from the 
moment of that Order giving Shell the exclusive right to drill, 
Mr. Bennion and all other mineral interest owners in the section 
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were denied the right to capture any oil and gas under their 
property and exercise the usual rights of ownership thereon. The 
logical quid pro quo of that denial of property rights is to 
guarantee that for the lost right to capture and sell the oil and 
gas, the individual owner will receive the right to a share of 
the production itself--which is precisely what the Utah Act 
provides. 
That being the case, there is little logic in Shell's 
argument that Mr. Bennion had no right to production, even though 
his property was being drained, and he was being precluded from 
drilling his own well, unless and until he filed an application 
with the Board. If this Court refused to follow both the Board 
the the Court below in holding that the Pooling Order is retroac-
tive to the date of first production, it would in effect take Mr. 
Bennion's property and give it to the Respondent without any 
offsetting compensation, and find no constitutional infirmity in 
so doing. Such a conclusion is untenable. Not only would it 
violate our constitutional guarantees on both state and federal 
levels, it would, in any context, be absurd. Yet it is just such 
a result that the Respondent argues for. 
Moreover, the efforts expended by Shell in its brief on 
the basic question of retroactivity indicate that Shell either 
perceives but dimly the true issue on appeal or that it wants to 
camouflage the real issu~ by drawing the Court's attention to the 
outdated law of capture. As mentioned earlier in this Brief, 
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both the Board and the trial court recognized that Mr. Bennion's 
royalty interest and working interest operated retroactively to 
the date of first production, because it occurred after the entry 
of the Spacing Order. In fact, Shell does not appeal that 
determination; but makes an argument against it in its brief only 
to set up the self-serving statement that Shell attempted to 
voluntarily pay Mr. Bennion a share of proceeds from first 
production, having no legal obligation to do so. See Respon-
dent's Brief at 16. 
The true issue which this Court must determine is whether 
Mr. Bennion's recognized share of production can be demanded in 
kind. It is inconsistent for the Board and the trial court to 
recognize the right to payment of a nonconsenting owner's inter-
est in kind as existing under the Act but not retroactively when, 
indeed, his interests to proceeds are enforced retroactively. 
There is no logical nor legal basis for drawing such a dis-
tinction between interests prior to pooling and interests subse-
quent. The statute certainly lends no support for such an 
arbitrary distinction: 
... as to each owner who does not agree, he shall 
be entitled to receive from the person or persons 
drilling and operating the well on the unit his 
share of the production applicable to his interest. 
Utah Code Anno. § 40-6-6(g) (prior to 1977 
amendments.) 
In his treatise, Kulp defines "royalty" in the context of 
an oil and gas lease as: 
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A share of the product or proceeds therefrom 
reserved to the lessor as a part of the consid-
erati?n for execution of the lease. Kulp, Oil and 
Gas Rights, Topic 6 § 10.36 (1954). 
A common provision in many leases is to allow the mineral inter-
est lessor the right to receive production in kind. Apparently, 
the Board and the trial court treated Mr. Bennion as a forced 
lessor and gave him the right of a lessor to demand production in 
kind. That right should be co-extensive with the right as a 
forced lessor to share proportionately in production of the well 
from the date of its first production. Any other interpretation 
of Mr. Bennion's rights would put him on a less fa~ored, discrim-
inatory status vis a vis the other mineral interest owners, a 
result which the intent of the Act cannot tolerate. 
B. Retroactive Payment of Mr. Bennion's Share of 
Production In Kind Is Just and Fair Under the 
Circumstances. 
Shell's other argument, that it would be grossly unfair 
for Mr. Bennion to receive his product in kind, considering the 
dramatic movement in oil prices during recent years, is both 
specious and unfounded. Shell contends that Mr. Bennion was 
dilatory in making his demand for production in kind and in 
pursuing a pooling order; therefore, awarding him the relief he 
seeks would defeat the purposes of the Act. By so contending, 
Shell would have this Court see Mr. Bennion as a scheming one who 
purposefully orchestrated the delay of Shell's payment to coin-
cide with the course of world oil prices, of which Mr. Bennion is 
imagined somehow to have had a prophetic foreknowledge. 
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Such a picture does not fit into the facts as contained 
in the record on appeal. The reality is that Mr. Bennion put 
Shell on notice of his demands in a timely fashion, and that Mr. 
Bennion timely filed for relief with the Board. Specifically, 
Mr. Bennion notified Shell in 1973 that he wanted production in 
kind, well before the time of his application with the Board in 
1975. Thereafter, Mr. Bennion repeatedly attempted to negotiate 
with Shell concerning his entitlement to receive production in 
kind. 
The plain truth of the matter is that Shell was the 
dilatory party in this dispute. Shell tries to get much mileage 
from its offers to pay Mr. Bennion a percentage of proceeds from 
the production which occurred between the Spacing and Pooling 
Orders. But Mr. Bennion exercised his right to demand payment in 
kind, which Shell refused to make at a time well before the rise 
in oil prices. Had Shell not been guilty of wrongfully withhold-
ing such payment, and had paid production in kind as the oil or 
gas was produced, there would be no element of "windfall" present 
in this suit. Furthermore, all considerations of payment in kind 
aside, Shell made no payments of cash until ordered to by the 
Board of Oil, Gas & Mining. 
A similar situation occurred in Wood Oil Co. v. Corpo-
ration Corrnnission (Wood #2), 239 P.2d 1023 (Okla. 1950). In that 
case, the mineral interest owner (Toklan) delayed for a time 
before asserting his rights to a share of production. The unit 
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operator (Wood Oil), on the other hand delayed in making payments 
of shares to Toklan, but nevertheless raised Toklan's delay as 
grounds for estopping its assertion of a share in production. 
The court held: 
With the entry of the [spacing] order of April 1, 
1947, the right of Toklan to participate in the 
production arose as a matter of law and Wood Oil, 
. . . cannot properly ask to profit by the laxity 
of another which, at worst, is but comparable to 
its own. Id. at 1027. 
Furthermore, Shell's argument that an award of payment of 
production in kind prior to the pooling order would be unfair 
fails to take into consideration the fact that Shell could have 
noticed up for hearing Mr. Bennion's involuntary pooling applica-
tion if it had so desired. Instead Shell chose to wait and see 
if it could persuade Mr. Bennion to sign the pooling agreement 
and fit neatly into Shell's desired program of operation. Shell 
should not now be allowed to impose a standard on Mr. Bennion 
which Shell itself has not met. 
If one of the purposes of the Act is to provide involun-
tary pooling where a drilling unit cannot be voluntarily pooled, 
it is just as feasible for the operator of that drilling unit to 
pursue such an application with the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, 
as it is with a royalty interest owner. This feature is espe-
cially important in view of the fact that in most instances the 
operator, with its legal sophistication in oil and gas matters, 
will be in a better position to avail itself of statutory 
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remedies provided by the Act than the individual mineral interest 
owner. 
Furthermore, the true inequity in the present dispute is 
that Mr. Bennion had to wait almost seven years, even after Shell 
was fully aware of his claims, to receive his royalties. Ger-
tainly if any one was dilatory, it was Shell and not Mr. Bennion. 
Shell ignored Mr. Bennion's repeated requests for his oil and gas 
in kind, and only after being ordered by a state agency, did it 
pay Mr. Bennion an amount "purportedly" due him. Shell's con-
tention that it did this "voluntarily" is completely specious, as 
a reading of the record reveals. 
III. MR. BENNION IS ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT INTEREST SINCE HIS 
RIGHT TO RECEIVE ROYALTIES EXISTED FROM THE DATE OF THE 
WELL'S FIRST PRODUCTION. 
It is unquestionable that if Mr. Bennion was not entitled 
to receive any royalties prior to the date of the Board's Interim 
Order, he would not be entitled to any prejudgment interest. 
Obviously, prejudgment interest does not accrue until such time 
an obligation or an indebtedness exists. Shell argues that since 
no debt existed prior to the time of the Board's order, it now 
has no obligation for prejudgment interest. Such an argument is 
not only fallacious., but also completely contrary to the position 
taken by the Board in entering the Order from which this appeal 
is taken. 
Not only did the Board decide that Mr. Bennion was 
entitled to receive production in cash from the date of the 
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well's first production, but it also awarded Mr. Bennion six per 
cent interest, or $2,554.06 on his royalty interest from the date 
of first production through May 6, 1980. It is not clear why the 
Board chose not to award Mr. Bennion interest on his working 
interest as well. However, it is only logical that if he is 
entitled to receive interest on his royalty interest, he also is 
entitled to receive interest on his working interest as well. 
Both royalty obligations were withheld from Mr. Bennion when due 
and payable to him, and therefore Shell is obligated for interest 
on the amount of each royalty from the date it was due and 
payable through May 6, 1980. 
CONCLUSION 
Fundamentally, this case is one of property rights in gas 
and oil produced by TEWl-lBS Well. Shell's arguments fail to 
address the basic fact that the assets produced by Shell belong 
in part to Mr. Bennion. The Oil and Gas Conservation Act does 
more than conserve our energy resources; it serves another 
purpose of safeguarding the private property rights of an indi-
vidual mineral interest owner as guaranteed by our state and 
federal constitutions. In accordance with those guarantees, and 
in the interest of fairness, Appellant respectfully prays this 
Court to grant Mr. Bennion his proportionate share of oil and gas 
in kind from the time of first production. 
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